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Terrorism is a notoriously difficult concept that defies single 
universal definition. Terrorists intentionally employ violence 
in order to instill fear in their victims and the wider public. 
Terrorist movements aim to achieve their political, social 
and/or religious goals through use of violent acts (Hoffman, 
1998: 43). In most cases terrorism is perpetrated by non-state 
actors and is "bottom up" challenge to the existing political 
order. However this article argues that the nature of the crime 
and not the perpetrator should determine whether some 
criminal act constitutes terrorism and acts of terror can also be 
committed by states and/or state actors. In this article, the 
author will examine the overall strategy and tactics used by the 
Milosevic and Karadzic regimes in BiH and Kosovo to fulfil 
their wartime ambitions of maintaining and consolidating 
control over Serb and Serb-occupied territory, relying 
primarily upon the indictments and judgments of the ICTY in 
which they and members of their armed forces acting under 
their authority have been charged and/or convicted of war 
crimes and terror, along with reports from international 
organizations such as the United Nations and other sources. 
Through an analysis of these tactics against leading definitions 
of terrorism, it will be demonstrated that rather than fighting 
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regimes carried out acts of terror during the wars in Kosovo and BiH, 
respectively, and furthermore Milosevic was sponsoring state-terrorism in 
BiH (Blakely, 2012: 3-4).  
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In their respective defences before the United Nations International 
Criminal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), both former President of Serbia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Slobodan Milosevic, and 
former President of the Serbian Republic (RS) of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), Radovan Karadzic, justified their actions during the wars in Kosovo 
and BiH as legitimate responses against terrorism. (ICTY, Milosevic 
Transcript, Feb 14 2002: 253). On the opening day of his defence against 
charges for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by military 
and paramilitary forces in Kosovo, Milosevic described the actions of the 
FRY army in Kosovo as ‘a struggle against terrorism’. He claimed that: 
 
‘[t]he task of the military and of the police was to neutralise the actions of 
terrorists and to protect civilians at the same time, to protect citizens. All orders, 
all actions taken by commanders and individuals corroborate this’ (ICTY, 
Milosevic Transcript, Feb 14 2002: 254). 
 
He argued that rather than committing crimes, the army and the police 
‘defended their own country with honour and chivalry’ (ICTY, Milosevic 
Transcript, Feb 14 2002: 253). 
Similarly, on the opening day of his defence, Karadzic, who is charged 
with war crimes including sniping and shelling the civilian population of 
Sarajevo ‘to spread terror among the civilian population’ (ICTY, Karadzic 
Indictment, Oct 19 2009: 37), denied that he was guilty, describing a 
‘horrible course of events’ against Bosnian Serb victims of ‘state-sponsored 
terrorism’ by Muslim authorities who sought independence from 
Yugoslavia and to draw international forces into the conflict (ICTY, 
Karadzic Transcript, 2 March 2010: 933). He asserted: 
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‘What the young Muslims wanted can only be achieved through terror or by 
foreign intervention. The [Muslim leadership] failed to manage to achieve that 
through terror. They tried to maintain terror and to invite foreign intervention’ 
(ICTY Karadzic Transcript, 2 March 2010: 958). 
 
However, contrary to the claims of both Milosevic and Karadzic, as 
argued by the ICTY Prosecution and further demonstrated through the 
factual and legal findings of the ICTY in its judgements, rather than 
quelling a terrorist threat, both the Milosevic and Karadzic regimes used 
terror tactics to further their wartime aims of consolidating control over 
territory in Kosovo and BiH through a strategy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the 
non-Serb population (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 3-8). The 
tactics they utilized to meet their aims, included murders of civilians and 
non-combatants; targeting and spreading fear amongst the civilian 
population; torture; destruction of property, cultural, religious symbols and 
monuments; rape and other forms of sexual violence; and publicising their 
acts in order to achieve a terror-inspiring effect (United Nations Security 
Council, 27 May 1994: 33). These tactics fit within definitions of terrorism 
used by States, international organizations, and scholars. 
 
2. Definitions of Terrorism 
 
The question of whether States can be terrorists remains a subject of 
considerable debate. Ganor argues that the term terrorism is redundant 
when describing State action because under the Geneva Conventions, 
deliberate attacks upon the civilian population by regular military forces 
during wartime constitute war crimes, while such attacks during peacetime 
constitute crimes against humanity (Ganor, 2002: 289). Kushner notes that 
many understand terrorism to exclude violence committed by 
governments, asserting that ‘when nations engage in violence and killing as 
a means of reaching a particular political end, it should be called 
oppression, not terrorism’ (Kushner, 2002: 344). Similarly, Wight notes that 
most people refer to terrorism as a form of non-state violence (Wight, 2012: 
57). 
On the other hand, Riegler (2009: 2) claims that certain types of violence 
carried out by states can legitimately be categorized as ‘terrorism’. He 
argues that “State terrorists imitate their enemies” and describes the 
“essence” of state terrorism as ‘fighting designated “terrorists” in ways that 
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are themselves part of the terrorist arsenal’. He further explains that State 
terrorism is underpinned by a strong ideological foundation according to 
which ‘the struggle against the subversive enemy can only end in the 
enemy’s total annihilation’ (Riegler, 2009: 2). Blakely further asserts that 
‘definitions of terrorism should be based on the nature of the act, and not 
the actor’ and thus ‘there is no reason why actions by the state cannot be 
labelled as terrorism, if those acts fit the definition’ (Blakely, 2012: 2). 
The debate regarding whether States can be terrorists is evident in the 
lack of agreement regarding the definition of terrorism. While some 
definitions explicitly recognize State terrorism, it is unclear whether the 
actions of States fall within others. The United Nations Security Council has 
defined terrorism in Resolution 1566 (2004), which refers to ‘criminal acts, 
including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a Government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’. (Security 
Council, Resolution 1566, 8 October 2004: 2). Additionally, negotiations 
have been ongoing since 2002 within the United Nations General Assembly 
for an international convention on terrorism, which includes a revised 
definition of terrorism (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, July 2008: 6). The draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism (Draft Terrorism Convention) states that: 
 
1. ’Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, 
causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of 
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation 
system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major 
economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or 
an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act’ 
(United Nations General Assembly, 28 Jan – 1 Feb 2002: 10).  
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While the definition set out in Resolution 1566 does not explicitly 
exclude States from responsibility for terrorist acts, the limitation in the 
Draft Terrorism Convention definition to ‘any person’ appears to exclude 
States, as well as groups generally. 
Other definitions explicitly recognize that States can commit terrorist 
acts. For example, Schmid and Jongman have described terrorism as ‘an 
anxiety – inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) 
clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby –in contrast to assassination –the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets.’ Schmid and Jongman explain that ‘[t]he 
immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) 
from a target population, and serve as message generators’ (Schmid and 
Jongman, 1988: 28). 
Ruth Blakeley defines the key elements of state terrorism as follows:  
‘1) There must be deliberate violence against individuals that the state 
has the duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a climate of fear has 
already been established through preceding acts of state violence; 2) The act 
must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, 
including paramilitaries and private security agents; 3) The act of threat of 
violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who 
identify with that victim; and 4) The target audience is forced to consider 
changing their behaviour in some way’ (Blakeley, 2012: 3-4). 
 
3. Strategies and Tactics of Parties to the Wars in the former Yugo-
slavia  
 
The charges brought by the Prosecution against ICTY accused and the 
factual findings of the Trial Chambers demonstrate the aims, strategies and 
tactics employed by the parties in the wars in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 
Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 3-8). This article will set out charges and 
findings in relation to relevant cases to demonstrate the manner in which 
the Serbian State carried out terrorist acts in Kosovo and sponsored 
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4. Strategies and tactics of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo  
 
The ICTY Prosecutor indicted Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide committed in BiH, Croatia and Kosovo.1 
(ICTY Case Information Sheet) Although due to his death in ICTY 
detention, the Trial Chamber was unable to deliver a judgment in relation 
to these charges, the indictment provides insight into the strategies and 
tactics used by the Milosevic regime to reach its aim of consolidating 
control over Kosovo, as well as Serb populated areas of BiH.  
As President of Serbia, Milosevic was indicted for planning and 
participating in a criminal plan, together with others, with the aim of ‘the 
expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from 
the territory of … Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued control over the 
province’ (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 3). The strategy used to 
fulfil this aim included ‘a deliberate and widespread and systematic 
campaign of terror and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians 
living in Kosovo and the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]’ (ICTY, 
Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 8). In terms of tactics used to implement 
this strategy, the accused ‘engaged in well-planned and coordinated 
operations’ that included the commission of various crimes by military 
forces acting under Milosevic’s direction and support (ICTY, Milosevic 
Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 8-9). 
Specifically, crimes included forcible expulsions and the internal 
displacement of ‘hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their 
homes’, facilitated by ‘an atmosphere of fear and oppression’ created by the 
military forces ‘through the use of force, threats of force and acts of 
violence (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 9)’. Tactics included 
‘widespread and systematic’ destruction of the property of Kosovo 
Albanian civilians through ‘widespread shelling of towns and villages’ and 
the burning of property, ‘including homes, farms, businesses, cultural 
monuments and religious sites’. Tactics also included ‘acts of brutality and 
violence against Kosovo Albanian civilians in order to perpetuate the 
climate of fear, create chaos and a pervading fear for life’. In this regard, 
Kosovo Albanians were said to have been ‘intimidated, assaulted or killed 
in public view to enforce the departure of their families and neighbours 
(ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 9)’. Civilians who were not 
                                                 
1 This article will only address crimes committed in Kosovo and BiH. 
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forcibly expelled allegedly fled ‘as a result of the climate of terror created 
by the widespread or systematic beatings, harassment, sexual assaults, 
unlawful arrests, killings, shelling and looting carried out across the 
province (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Oct 16 2001: 9). 
 
5. Strategies and tactics of the Milosevic and Karadzic regimes in BiH 
 
Similarly, with regard to BiH, Milosevic was alleged to have planned 
and participated, as a co-perpetrator, in a criminal plan with the aim of 
consolidating control over Serb-populated areas through a strategy of 
‘forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of [BiH]’. He 
allegedly controlled elements of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and its 
successor, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which participated in the planning, 
preparation, facilitation and execution of this plan (ICTY, Milosevic 
Indictment, Nov 22 2002: 5). He was also accused of exercising substantial 
influence over and assisting the political leadership of the self-proclaimed 
Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), including Radovan Karadzic and his vice 
President, Biljana Plavsic, in the planning, preparation, facilitation and 
execution of the plan. He was further alleged to have provided financial, 
logistical and political support to the VRS, participating in the formation, 
financing, supply, support and direction of special forces in the RS Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and also providing such support to Serbian irregular 
forces and paramilitaries, all who participated in the execution of the 
plan(ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Nov 22 2002: 5). Finally, he was believed 
to have ‘controlled, manipulated or otherwise utilized Serbian state-run 
media to spread exaggerated and false messages of ethnically based attacks 
by Bosnian Muslims and Croats against Serb people intended to create an 
atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs … which contributed to the 
forcible removal’ of non-Serbs (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Nov 22 2002: 
5). 
To implement this strategy, the military employed tactics including ‘the 
widespread killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, including during and 
after the take-over of territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and ‘in 
detention facilities’; ‘causing serious bodily and mental harm to … Bosnian 
Muslims during their confinement in detention facilities’, including 
subjecting them to or forcing them to witness during interrogations acts 
MA. Astrit LLESHI 
_____________________________ 
ILIRIA International Review – Vol 6, No 2 (2016) 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
168 
including ‘murder, sexual violence, torture and beatings’ (ICTY, Milosevic 
Indictment, Nov 22 2002: 5-12). 
Tactics also included forcible transfers of non-Serbs, carried out through 
attacks to force civilians to flee, rounding up remaining non-Serb civilians 
and forcibly removing them, or ‘impos[ing] restrictive and discriminatory 
measures on the non-Serb population and engag[ing] in a campaign of 
terror designed to drive them out of the territory’. Further tactics included 
‘the wanton destruction and plunder’ of the property of non-Serbs and of 
their religious and cultural buildings (ICTY, Milosevic Indictment, Nov 22 
2002: 10-12). 
 
6. Additional ICTY findings regarding strategies and tactics in Koso-
vo and BiH 
 
Although no final determination was made regarding Milosevic’s guilt 
for the crimes set forth above, the Trial Chamber delivered judgments in 
the case against Milan Milutinovic and others for crimes by Serb forces in 
Kosovo and in the case against Stanislav Galic for crimes committed in BiH 
by the VRS to which, as noted above (ICTY, Galic Judgement, Dec 5 2003: 
117, 251, 302). Milosevic was accused of providing financial, logistical and 
political support. These findings provide further insight into the aims, 
strategies and tactics of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo and BiH. 
In the case of Milutinovic and others, the Trial Chamber convicted the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, the Chief of Staff of the VJ, two 
commanders of army corps in Kosovo and the Head of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs Staff for Kosovo of participating in a criminal plan to 
‘modify the ethnic balance in Kosovo in order to ensure continued control 
by the FRY and Serbian authorities over the province’. The strategy to 
achieve this aim was ‘a widespread or systematic campaign of terror or 
violence, and the tactics employed within this strategy included 
deportation, forcible transfer, murder, and persecutions (ICTY, Milutinovic 
Judgement Vol 1, Feb 26 2009: 8-9). The Defence had unsuccessfully argued 
that the FRY and Serbian authorities were engaged in legitimate anti-
terrorist actions against the Kosovo Liberation Army (ICTY, Milutinovic 
Judgement Vol 1, Feb 26 2009: 325-326). 
In BiH, according to the ICTY Trial Chamber, the overall strategy of the 
Milosevic regime was implemented by actors including Stanislav Galic, the 
Commander of the ‘Sarajevo Romanija Corps’ of the VRS. Galic was found 
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guilty of conducting a campaign of sniping and shelling attacks on the city 
of Sarajevo, resulting in the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians. 
For this act he was convicted of war crimes including ‘acts of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population’ (ICTY, Galic Judgement, Dec 5 2003 : 117, 251, 302).  
 
7. Milosevic Regime Tactics as Terror Tactics 
 
An examination of the strategies and tactics used by the Milosevic 
regime to achieve its wartime aims in Kosovo and BiH against the 
definitions of terrorism set forth above shows that these strategies and 
tactics had hallmarks of terror. For example, as Riegler (2009: 2) describes, 
in both cases, the regime’s struggle against the enemy aimed for its ‘total 
annihilation’. Furthermore, in terms of the elements of state terrorism 
described by Blakely, the Milosevic regime: (1) deliberately committed 
violence against its citizens in Kosovo, whom it had a duty to protect, and 
sponsored such violence against the Muslim population in BiH; (2) these 
acts were committed by State institutions, including the JNA, VJ, VRS, and 
police forces, as well as paramilitaries; (3) as concluded by the ICTY Trial 
Chamber in both the Milutinovic and Galic cases, the acts of violence were 
part of a strategy with a primary purpose of inducing extreme fear into the 
civilian population; and (4) the targeted civilian populations in both 
Kosovo and BiH were ‘forced to consider changing their behavior in some 
way’, namely, to flee from their homes. 
The strategies and tactics also fit well within the United Nations 
definitions of terrorism. Regarding the Resolution 1566 definition, as noted 
above, the tactics included the commission of crimes against civilians, 
including death, serious bodily injury and unlawful detention. A purpose 
of these crimes was to ‘provoke a state of terror … in a group of persons’, 
namely, Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslim civilians. They also meet 
the three elements of the Draft Terrorism Convention definition, as the 
strategies employed and tactics caused death, serious injury, and property 
damage. Furthermore, these acts were conducted in part to intimidate the 
population. 
As noted above, it appears that acts committed by States are not meant 
to fall within the Draft Terrorism Convention definition of terrorism. 
However, as has been demonstrated, the acts committed by and sponsored 
by the Milosevic regime fit precisely within the elements of this definition. 
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Although Ganor (2002: 289-290) argues that such acts committed by States 
should not fall within the definition of terrorism because they are 
considered war crimes during wartime or crimes against humanity during 
peacetime, a counterargument is that acts by non-State actors under such 
circumstances may also constitute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. If non-state actors commit these crimes they fall under the 
definition of terrorism, and there is no reason for the same standard not to 




In conclusion, some authors consider that States cannot commit acts of 
terror and that such acts by States would rather constitute war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. However, this article demonstrates that these 
crimes can also be regarded as State terrorism. It is important that the 
definition of terrorism set forth in the final version of the Terrorism 
Convention and other definitions encompass terrorist acts by States so that 
effective international action can be taken to counter terrorism in all its 
forms (Security Council, Resolution 1566, 8 October 2004: 2).  
In Kosovo and BiH, there is a case to be made that State and State-
sponsored terror took place, since the majority of the victims of the 
Milosevic regime were civilians. The civilians were indiscriminately 
targeted and attacked by the State, which had a duty to protect them, and 
those attacks were perpetrated in a manner that created a climate of fear 
and terror in the general population. The regime used these tactics and this 
strategy in order to maintain control over and gain new territory. This is 
consistent with the views expressed by Blakely that ‘definitions of 
terrorism should be based on the nature of the act, and not the actor’ 
(Blakely, 2012: 2). 
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